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Public service markets: their economics,
institutional oversight and regulation
Xeni Dassiou1, Peter Langham2, Charles Nancarrow2, Alex Scharaschkin3 and Dan Ward4
ABSTRACT Public services in the United Kingdom have been transformed over the past
25 years with the introduction of market-oriented solutions into their provision. This has been
characterized by a shift away from state provision to independent providers, and by the
introduction of competition and choice. This shift was partly ideologically motivated and partly
driven by budget-cutting considerations following the global ﬁnancial crisis. As such, it has
been lacking a comprehensive economic justiﬁcation or method of analysis. It is now commonly
accepted that the language of economic markets is essential to frame arguments about how
effectively public services are achieving their intended outcomes. Using market language and
concepts may not always be comfortable for those from a traditional policymaking background.
It can nevertheless be very useful when designing investigations into the effectiveness and
value for money in the mechanisms of delivery of such services, whenever these services entail
a degree of user choice as is currently the case in large parts of health care, social care and
education (referred to as competition in the market). This article aims to provide a conceptual
basis on the way of thinking in these terms. We provide a description of the current state and
then comment on the desirability of this quasi-market approach. Uniquely in the literature,
we analyse the expected and desired developments by distinguishing between choice and
compulsory merit goods. In choice merit goods markets many users are unable to choose
effectively because of the existence of a number of demand-side or supply-side market failures.
Moreover, conﬂicts may exist between how service users actually make choices, and policy
objectives such as universality or equity, which may not be achieved simply by “leaving it to the
market”. The users of compulsory merit goods are typically a minority and unable to internalize
the full social beneﬁts of their actions; hence, it may be welfare-enhancing for society to coerce
them to “consume” these services. As choice cannot be an objective, the commissioning
(competition for the market) or direct provision by the state of such goods may meet public
policy objectives more effectively than the market mechanism alone. Building on these
foundations, this article discusses when public service markets (PSMs) are likely to be an
effective method of achieving public policy objectives, and when they may not be. We analyse
the implications for the institutional and legal framework, funding oversight and regulation
of PSMs as a result of their transformation into quasi-markets. We conclude with some
suggestions for those charged with overseeing PSMs in practice based on this analysis.
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Introduction
I
n the case of utilities, the goods are typically well deﬁned in
their characteristics, and hence price and output decisions are
the result of demand and supply market forces, except for a
few price regulated monopolies. However, the companies in such
industries have an interest in creating artiﬁcial complexity in the
hope of creating switching costs through the introduction of
complex bundle tariffs as in energy, mobile telecoms and so on,
which give rise to menu and search costs. Such moves are
designed by companies to impede effective competition by
creating consumer inertia and relying on loss aversion, framing
and other consumer behavioural biases to restrict the consumers’
ability to “access, assess and act” on information (a phrase coined
by Fletcher, 2013).
In the early years of deregulation in utilities, as the user is
typically the payer, well-established techniques of price cap
setting (for example, RPI-X) were in place in these market
segments where competition was not yet effective to avoid
monopoly power abuse of buyers by sellers. The segments where
this still applies today are the infrastructure segments with natural
monopoly characteristics such as transmission or distribution
companies in energy; typically the buyers in such price regulated
segments are not the end users, but upstream and downstream
companies. Vertical unbundling and technological change have
made possible the removal of natural monopoly characteristics
in many segments of the value chain. Thus market failure in utilities
was eliminated, and with it the main case for regulation. As effective
competition ﬂourished, price caps were removed in markets such
as retail gas and electricity, generation, telecoms and so on, while
the role of the regulator has evolved to one of both providing
information to the customers to alleviate their information
asymmetries by enabling them to make effective choices, and
enforcing competition using concurrent competition powers.
The nature of the “goods” that are “traded” in public service
markets (PSMs) is often very different from those in many private
and utilities markets, as the former are typically merit goods
whose users do not fully internalize the social beneﬁts of their
choices and where the user-pays principle does not always apply
(Dassiou et al., 2015, forthcoming). Unlike utilities, many of these
services are either free at the point of delivery (for example,
health) or ﬁxed (for example, universities), thus removing price
signals. These markets, coined by Le Grand (1991) as quasi-
markets, have been opened up to the “market mechanism”
through the introduction of competition and user choice over the
last 25 years. There is an extensive literature that reports on the
results of such changes. Indicatively, in education Glennerster
(1991) comments on the introduction of quasi-markets reforms
and Bradley and Taylor (2002) on the implications of these
reforms on efﬁciency and equity. More recently, Bradley and
Taylor (2010) examine the impact on exams performance of
quasi-market reforms (competition, parental choice, market
concentration and the introduction of specialist schools).
Lubienski (2009) reviews the impact of the introduction of more
autonomy, competition and choice on innovation in education in
OECD countries. In health, Propper (1995, 2012), Propper et al.
(2004, 2008), Propper and Venables (2013) discuss on the initial
focus in reducing waiting times and its detrimental effects on
unobservable quality and the subsequent abolition of internal
market price competition in elective care and shift to increasing
hospital choice by allowing more competition among providers.
Doetter and Götze (2011) comment on the introduction of the
internal market and competition during the 90s followed by
the re-assertion of the state in ﬁnancing and the regulation of
quality in the 2000s. According to Gaynor et al. (2012), as of
2008 there has been a policy shift with the focus on quality-based
competition, and the shifting of responsibility for commissioning
care to general practitioners (GPs).
PSMs constitute a signiﬁcant part of government expenditure.
According to Fig. 1 (data sourced from ukpublicspending.co.
uk), the share of UK’s government expenditure peaked to just
over 45% of the GDP in 2010 and is planned to decline to 40%
in 2016. Figures 2, 3 and 4 give the share of health care,
education and welfare (including family and children, unem-
ployment, housing payments, social exclusion, social protection
and R&D social protection) in government spending during the
last 30 years. We see that health-care spending has hovered to
around 7.5% during the last few years, education has declined
from 6% to just over 5% with plans to further reduce it in the
coming years, while welfare has been reduced from 7.3% in 2010
to 6.5% in 2014 with a further planned reduction to 6% in 2016.
These trends are also easy to see in Table 1 (Eurostat data).
These ﬁgures reﬂect the current government’s policy of ring
fencing spending on health care from spending cuts, keeping
education spending constant in nominal terms and reducing
welfare spending. According to ﬁgures from 2012 (OECD,
2015), the number of teaching staff at all levels of education
was just over 900,000, while there are 1.3 million staff working
for over 1,000 different employers for the National Health
Service (NHS) (http://hee.nhs.uk/work-programmes/workforce-
planning/, accessed 22 September 2015). In social care the
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Figure 1 | Total spending in the United Kingdom from FY 1986 to 2016.
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number of people in adult social care jobs in England was estimated
at 1.50 million in 2012. Since 2009 employees have continued
to shift away from local authority services (−15%) and towards
independent employers (+15%), while the number of people
receiving direct payments to purchase their care has increased
by 50% (http://www.skillsforcare.org.uk/Document-library/NMDS-
SC,-workforce-intelligence-and-innovation/Research/Size-and-structure-
2013-vweb2.pdf, accessed 22 September 2015).
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Figure 2 | Total spending on health care in the United Kingdom from FY 1986 to 2016.
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Figure 3 | Total spending on education in the United Kingdom from FY 1986 to 2016.
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Figure 4 | Total spending on welfare from FY 1986 to 2016.
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The creation of PSMs has intensiﬁed or given rise to a number
of market failures that may justify state or regulatory interven-
tion:1 some are features of the characteristics of the service or of
the users (that is, the demand side), while others are a product of
the supply side. These are explained in the sections “Demand-side
market failures” and “Supply-side market failures” where we use
market deﬁnition analysis, a core tool in competition economics
for evaluating the strength of competition in markets.2 In the
section “Overseeing PSMs”, we analyse when PSMs are likely
to be an effective method of achieving public policy objectives,
and when they may not be and conclude with some suggestions
for what this all means for those charged with overseeing,
managing and regulating these markets in practice. We set out
our conclusions in the ﬁnal section.
Demand-side market failures
Merit goods. Services are typically merit goods, that is, char-
acterized by large positive externalities in their consumption.
Economic theory identiﬁes this as a clear market failure that
justiﬁes government intervention.3
Education, health and social care are typical examples of
“choice” merit goods (case example – Box 1) where, while the
good is not public (that is, the service is both rival and
excludable), the marginal social beneﬁt of the service signiﬁcantly
exceeds the marginal private beneﬁt. Of course, there are some
distinct types of health care that may require some compulsion
in their consumption (for example, the need to inoculate the
population to protect them from a dangerous communi-
cative disease), or choice is impossible (ambulance and A&E
services), or the need to make parents send their children to
school.
These goods are such that while state funding is justiﬁed to
avoid under consumption, in principle there is no reason why the
state could not just hand vouchers or direct payments to users
and let them choose a supplier, if they are in a position to do so
effectively. The reason why this does not happen even if we
assume hypothetically that all the users had the ability to
effectively choose in this manner (plurality of providers, free
entry and exit in the market, ability to access, assess and act on
information and so on) is that the state may wish to pursue
different objectives like fairness, ensuring quality, as well as
budget constraint considerations, which will not necessarily be
achieved if users choose providers in an unconstrained manner.
The other main category of merit goods that we deﬁne in this
article is “compulsory” merit goods: these are services where user
choice is either not desirable and/or their consumption is not
optional. Typically, the majority of citizens in a society do not
“consume” these goods/services (for example, they are not the
direct beneﬁciaries), but are strongly affected by the negative
externalities caused by their absence, or their underproduction in
quantity and/or quality.4 For example, goods like probation
services, jail services and workplace programmes are tax funded
and the justiﬁcation for this lies in the considerable externalities
of these services on the majority of the people in a society who
are not direct users. The minority who are the direct users of
such services may not wish to use them, but the extent of
their externalities justiﬁes the need to coerce them to do so
(for example, the unemployment beneﬁt takes the form of a
jobseeker’s allowance).
While private markets may satisfy part of the demand for merit
goods, in order for society to reach the optimum level of output
provision and avoid under consumption of the good what is
required is either:
 Subsidies: The government could give vouchers or assign
budgets to families to meet their health and/or education
needs; personal budgets or user entitlements now exist in a
number of public services.5 However, subsidies may not
be preferable if the state wants to prevent “undesirable”
outcomes stemming from a mismatch between public policy
objectives funded by taxpayers’ money and the preferences of
the users or
 Commissioning: State provision of the good, to ensure the wider
social beneﬁts of these services (for example, probation services,
work placement services, waste management services). The
latter, alongside the existing private provision where it exists
(as in health and education, care and so on), should give an
outcome closer to the socially optimum, satisfying the wider
public policy objectives that the market mechanism alone will
not meet, as the users do not internalize the full social beneﬁts
of their actions.
Complex, experience goods. While in the case of utilities,
the goods and services provided are usually standard products
with well-deﬁned physical attributes, in the case of PSMs
the goods can be complex and personalized services that are
“experience” (or even “credence”) goods with different quality
attributes and features. For instance, across all types of care,
quality is heavily reliant on individual relationships with care
workers, and it is therefore difﬁcult to determine the quality of
the service before purchase. Box 2 illustrates some of the
characteristics of health care that contribute to the difﬁculty
in assessing and measuring the quality of the treatment con-
cerned with certainty.
Moreover by their nature some of these goods are major
life decisions with little room for switching in the case of a poor
choice (school, university, social care, health care) without
signiﬁcant inconvenience and disruption. In the case of a frail,
elderly resident in a care home, their original choice of the care
home may have been poor owing to it being made in a hurry and
at a time of mental distress. The prospect, however, of switching
homes may be too big a disruption for them to even contemplate
Table 1 | Government spending in the United Kingdom by
function (percentage of total government spending)
2000 2005 2010 2013
Public order and safety 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.8
Health 14.3 15.4 16.1 16.7
Education 13.0 13.5 13.5 12.0
Sickness and disability 6.7 6.2 5.8 6.2
Family and children 4.8 6.4 4.8 3.7
Source: Eurostat.
Box 1 | Case example—social care
Social care is characterized by positive externalities (a civilized
society expects those people needing care and without sufﬁcient
ﬁnancial means to have their care needs met). The private care market
caters for those able to pay for their own care; however, left to the
market alone, care would be under-consumed leaving very vulnerable
people without ﬁnancial means to fend for themselves, which explains
in principle the policy rationale for government funding social care.
When users do not pay for a service there is a risk of overconsumption,
so government needs a system of gate-keepers (for example, GPs, care
professionals) to ensure only eligible recipients receive publicly
funded care.
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and the individual effectively becomes “locked in” to that
provider. This means that the user/consumer is either:
a not in a position to engage effectively in the market and
exercise choice or switch in the normal way because of the
problems described above or
b for compulsory merit goods, it is not desirable that the
consumer takes a decision as it is preferable that the state
decides on the level of consumption and provision (jail services
and so on).
Principal-agent issues. Whereas in utility markets the good is
purchased by the user who pays the price and the providers meet
this demand, in the case of PSMs this is different: the user is not
necessarily the buyer of the service (as this may be commissioned
on their behalf) and they typically do not pay for it. Choice and
competition may exist, or choice may be exercised on behalf of
the user by an agent or at least with the advice of an agent
say, a GP.
The asymmetry of information in some PSMs is a market
failure that gives them similar characteristics to those found in
ﬁnancial services, where consumers take ﬁnancial decisions with
the advice of an intermediary/broker/adviser or more recently
comparison websites, to choose ﬁnancial products, for example,
mortgages, personal pensions, ISAs and so on. The problem is
whether the agent (say, the GP in health care) is incentivized in
such a way so as to promote the interests of the principal, who is
in this case the service user. The position is further compounded
by the dual role of the GP as a budget holder and a prescriber of
the most appropriate treatment.6 The type of provider can also
play a role as well: for example, the raison d’etre of a mutual
company is the promotion of the customers’ interests, thus
alleviating problems of asymmetric information between users
and providers. We discuss this further below.
Even in the cases where the user does exercise choice by
purchasing the service directly and without an agent (this may
take the form of an ear-marked budget or vouchers), the user’s
choice is restricted by the funding for the service from the
relevant local authority. For example, with school choice it would
be more accurate to say that the user (the parent) can state a
preference rather than being able to exercise the right to choose
which school their child attends. Hence, the choice of available
school places are restricted by how many schools there are in the
area, as well as the capacity of these schools. Moreover, it is
restricted by what the user considers as substitutes, which may be:
 the result of geographical considerations (proximity);
 the way funding is provided as we have seen in the case of
vouchers used in schools in Scandinavia, which may broaden
the market deﬁnition to include the private sector; or
 the result of substantial price changes as we have seen in the
case of universities’ market deﬁnition slowly evolving from
national to international,7 or regulatory constraints (for
example, school catchment areas, GP registration restrictions
and so on). We return to the market deﬁnition issues in
PSMs below.
Similarly to ﬁnancial services regulation, asymmetric information
between the buyers and the sellers gives rise to both adverse
selection (where buyers do not have full information regarding
the quality of the goods they purchase) and moral hazard.
A demonstration of the latter can be found in the spectacular
collapse of many of the providers in the ﬁnancial industry that
were bailed out by the government during the economic crisis.
In the case of PSMs, where assets are owned by independent
organizations rather than government there is a risk of moral
hazard whereby failed organizations can exploit public demand
for service continuity by demanding bail outs or excessive returns
for investment.
Overconsumption. Unlike utilities markets, many of the quasi-
markets are characterized by extensive tax-funded provision.
Hence, there is a need for gate keepers to avoid overconsumption
when excludability is difﬁcult to enforce and the user does not
pay. For example, a GP is not only a provider of information
(intermediary), but also a gatekeeper and budget holder to the
health system. This means that as an agent he may face con-
ﬂicting incentives in his dual role, unless incentives are properly
set to correct this.
Interestingly, referral by a GP is necessary even in the case
where the patient elects to go private. This is because private
health care is not only provided by the 200 or so private hospitals,
but also on private patient units in NHS hospitals. There is clearly
some degree of competition for scarce resources as private health-
care providers rely to some extent on the infrastructure and
resources of the state ones (and vice versa for less serious routine
operations, with the NHS using private providers to alleviate
waiting lists problems) resulting to a degree of complementarity
as opposed to substitutability on the supply side. It should be
noted that there have been state attempts to mimic this
complementarity in secondary education, by asking private
schools to share some of their human resources and infra-
structure in the provision of state education.
Supply-side market failures
Provider–purchaser (p–p) separation and weak market
mechanisms. PSMs are often “thin” and can take the form of
local or regional markets with a bilateral monopoly or a mono-
psony. When a local authority commissions services it may face a
single provider, or its buyer power may give it monopsonistic
power in a local market. It is hoped that a movement from a
bilateral monopoly to one where there is plurality of different
types of providers will assist with cost discovery that will enable
the government to set a fair price (tariff) for the service through
benchmarking, as well as providing the market with comparators
not only in terms of costs but also in terms of quality. Figure 5
(National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO) report, 2013: 5) shows the different
types of market situation that government may face in PSMs, and
the type of interventions that may be necessary to ensure that
policy objectives are met.
In some PSMs competition is either set in terms of price and
quality as in social care and work placement services, whereas in
Box 2 | Attributes of some types of health care
It is often difﬁcult to measure the quality of health care. Many
components of a health service that commissioners or patients value
are difﬁcult or impossible to measure. Some of the reasons for this
can be:
Time lags—For example, a good indicator of the quality of a cancer
service would be how many patients survive for 10 years after
treatment. But to ﬁnd this out you have to wait 10 years, by which point
the service offered might have changed completely.
Difﬁculty of establishing a counterfactual—For example, if a patient
has an operation and is left in severe pain afterwards, it can be hard to
tell if this is due to an unusually bad surgeon or to a good surgeon
dealing with an unusually severe injury.
Problems of attribution—The NHS is only one factor affecting a
patient’s life, and their long-term health outcomes are also affected by
things like their lifestyle, their age and their genes.
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others the government sets a ﬁxed price to providers and asks
them to compete in terms of quality when the latter is more
difﬁcult to determine (for example, certain types of health care).
In both cases the replacement of a bilateral monopoly with that of
a monopsony, by introducing plurality on the provision side, will
raise issues of ﬁnance-ability of the providers as the price set
by the commissioning authority will need to sustain supply at
acceptable levels as well as ensuring that it is reﬂective of the cost
of provision without adversely affecting quality. Hence as
indicated in the north west quadrant in Fig. 5, the existence of
a single buyer (for example, in the form of a local authority) may
require intervention to ensure the sustainability and continuity of
provision by providers as well as their willingness to bid in the
next round.
According to the Institute for Government, “Today roughly £1
in every £3 that government spends on public services goes to
independent providers” (Gash et al., 2013: 4). Separation of the
providers from the commissioning side introduces coordination
problems and transaction costs in contracting if the product is
difﬁcult to deﬁne or difﬁcult to verify the value for money and
quality of provision. All this is compounded by the dearth of
data or inconsistency in data collecting between different LAs.
As an alternative the state could provide the service itself either
exclusively (effectively eliminating the principal-agent problem),
or along with other providers (thus retaining a public sector
comparator to the mix). Reputation and some competitive
pressure through the existence of comparators may alleviate
some of the problems arising from the asymmetry of information
between the transacting bodies. As an illustration of the problems,
in the case of health, while there was initially hope that nearly all
of the NHS contracts would be awarded through competitive
bidding, there is now an acceptance that non-competitive
contracting is sometimes the best choice if the process is
transparent and clearly beneﬁts the patients.8
This is strikingly reminiscent of the Swedish health-care
experience where separation between p–p was put in place in
2003. The split proved ineffective because of a lack of contracting
know-how by the purchasers that led to them being dominated by
providers due to the latter’s greater amount of knowledge and
information. Ultimately this led to either the p–p split being
modiﬁed/terminated or a shift of the emphasis over the years
in achieving efﬁciency through collaboration and coordination
between local authorities and providers rather than efﬁciency
through competition contracting.
As indicated in Fig. 5, the desired direction of travelling is
towards the north east quadrant, where an efﬁcient market
mechanism has been achieved with a large number of buyers
and sellers. As mentioned in the section “Principal-agent issues”,
the market for higher education has broadly reached this box as
students do pay (through government loans) for their studies and
can now shop around as British universities face ever-increasing
competition from European universities offering English language
degrees. However in England university fees are still capped and
the fact that the majority of universities has clustered to the upper
£9,000 fee cup is indicative of a market failure in the form of
information asymmetry on the side of buyers (adverse selection)
leading to a “market for lemons” where price ends up indicating
quality (Akerlof, 1970). In the case of domiciliary care, according
the UK Homecare Association (Holmes, 2015), the Care Quality
Commission (CQC) has 8,186 registered locations (including
people in their own home) where such care is provided.
Currently, around 92.1% of such care is delivered by the
independent and voluntary sector commissioned by the local
authority (LA), while the remaining is delivered by a LA in-house
team. The respective ﬁgures in 2008/2009 were 81% and 19%,
respectively, illustrating the growing trend for the independent
sector undertaking increasing responsibility for the delivery of
such care. The number of adults receiving direct payments for
such care in England increased from 107,000 in 2009/2010 to
153,295 (out of a total of 469,725 sate funded by the LA) in
2013/2014, underlying the increasing trend for the direct user of
such services exercising choice.9
Overall it is difﬁcult to categorize in Fig. 5 what we refer to
as compulsory merit goods, as for example offender manage-
ment services. The ﬁrst privately managed prison opened in
1992, followed by another eight private prisons by successive
governments. In 2004 the National Probation Service and
Her Majesty’s Prison Service merged to create the National
Offender Management Service (NOMS). While NOMS was
created incorporating a clear p–p split, with the plan of
outsourcing offender management (that is, moving into the
north west quadrant in Fig. 5 through the introduction of a
plurality of providers), such outsourcing slowed down
with probation trusts (35 in number, accountable to NOMS)
remaining in the public sector and no further expansion of
private prisons between 2005 and 2010 (TUC, 2014: 10).
Outsourcing has currently resumed with a proposed privatization
of 70% of probation workload. This, however, has been disrupted
by the case of two large contractors who have admitted to
overcharging the taxpayer for the electronic monitoring contracts
to the tune of millions of pounds in fraudulent claims. As prison
contracts were held by just three companies, the barring of two
from bidding for any new contracts has returned the framework
into a bilateral monopoly (back to the south west quadrant in
Fig. 5, of a weak market mechanism). As the trusts have only
begun commissioning in the last few years, the majority has not
much experience in commissioning, procurement and contract
management. This is compounded by the fact that it is difﬁcult to
measure value added by the provider and also by the fact that
reoffending is not only affected by the efﬁcacy of probation
services but also by the performance of other services. Finally, the
fact that such services are largely affected by the government’s
ultimate decision making and its coercive authority introduces
high policy uncertainty, which largely explains why the repeated
attempts to open up such services to competition have failed
(Gash et al., 2013).
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Figure 5 | Different types of market situation in PSMs.
Note: Achieved by encouraging new entry, sustaining a range of
providers, increasing choice and personalization.
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.35
6 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 1:15035 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.35 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
Barriers to entry and exit. A lack of contracting capability can be
problematic not only on the side of the commissioning authority,
but also from the side of the suppliers, which may lead to barriers
to entry for smaller inexperienced suppliers. An example of this
can be found in utilities regulation concerning the regulatory
burden in the supply of electricity and gas. According to the
State of the Market Assessment Report (Ofﬁce of Fair Trading
(OFT), Ofﬁce for Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), 2014, page 13),
the industry is governed by a number of codes. The complexity
and costs of compliance is burdensome and can place at a dis-
advantage smaller suppliers that can ill afford such costs. Simi-
larly, mutuals and other small suppliers may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
survive once their preferential treatment in being awarded con-
tracts expires and complex licensing/procurement/regulatory
structures develop. On the other hand, a continuing preferential
setting for smaller ﬁrms/mutuals will create a disincentive to grow
up, thus creating barriers to expansion (perverse incentives). This
is not a novel concern; it features in the market for electricity and
gas, where the existence of a size threshold below which a supplier
is not required to meet social and environmental obligations may
act as a barrier to expansion. On the other hand, Crowe et al.
(2014: 6) argue that because of a recent shift to outcome-based
contracts of increasing complexity, “public service commissioners
… are becoming less connected to smaller and social sector
providers” who increasingly depend for their survival on sub-
contracting or forming partnerships with large private sector
partners. We return to barriers to entry, supply competition and
ownership structures below.
Natural monopoly characteristics. Natural monopoly char-
acteristics as in the case of hospitals can be viewed a little bit like
distribution companies in energy, resulting in regional monopo-
lists. Additionally, both are characterized by asset speciﬁcity.
It should be noted that in other sectors, such as elderly care, asset
speciﬁcity is less of a problem; for example, care homes can be
transformed into ﬂats. On the other hand, jails cannot. There are
also parts of health-care services such as diagnostic services that
are characterized by very large capital costs. In such cases it may
be appropriate for family doctors (GPs) to lease such services by a
single provider who owns the equipment. Box 3 illustrates some
of these issues for health-care services.
If a market can only support one or two providers,
“competition in the market” is unlikely to work effectively.
Moreover, the same factors that make these markets thin in the
ﬁrst place can often create signiﬁcant barriers to entry, meaning
competition for the market is not feasible either.10 In some cases
you may in fact end up with a bilateral monopoly, with a single
commissioner negotiating with a single provider.11 This leads to
the usual inefﬁciencies that come with bargaining. A solution is to
treat such cases as we treat infrastructure bottleneck facilities in
utilities: by price regulating for fair access to the use of such
services by GPs (the equivalent of transmission and distribution
access prices).
Supply competition, ownership structures and exit. Exit in
PSMs creates the problem of who takes over (for example, failing
sixth-form colleges). What happens to consumers facing failing
providers if there are no other providers in the market? As
mentioned this may give rise to moral hazard issues that can be
exploited by a provider to demand a bail out or additional
funding and in this way damage UK’s efﬁciency incentives by
removing the threat of exit from the market as a punishment for
inefﬁciency. For example, in 2011 the UK social care sector only
survived the potentially disorderly exit of the largest care bed
provider as a result of considerable effort by a number of orga-
nizations and individuals, without formal processes and powers
to call upon to ensure an orderly exit (Department of Health,
2013).
Public services such as health, social care and education are
essential to many people’s lives, which require government to
ensure arrangements are in place to maintain continuity of
service in order that harm or detriment to users is avoided (such
as reduced educational outcomes, or physical harm or even death
in the case of health or care), and policy objectives are met. Public
authorities must ensure that arrangements exist to guarantee
service continuity in the event of provider failure or exit. For this
reason, effective oversight in public services can require
government to monitor the ﬁnancial health of key providers to
assess the degree of risk that exists in the market to service
continuity for users.
Government has to avoid, however, providing explicit or
implicit guarantees to support providers that fall into ﬁnancial
difﬁculties, for this could risk weakening the incentives on
providers to manage their own businesses and maintain their
ﬁnancial viability. The government therefore has to balance the
need for poorly performing providers to exit the market with the
need to protect users by ensuring continuity of service.
Does ownership structure matter in outcomes? The emergence
of mutuals may deliver better outcomes for their customers as
by the very nature of their ownership such ﬁrms overcome
asymmetric information problems. In contrast, shareholder-
owned ﬁrms will promote the interests of their managers as well
as the shareholders and will typically take advantage of the
asymmetric information on the side of the users/purchasers.
Similarly, owner managed companies will go for proﬁt max-
imization; if they know that their customers are unable to discern
quality (in the short term anyway) then again there is little
prospect of the provider being punished for providing poor
service, thus dampening exit pressures (for example, barriers
to exit).
Overseeing PSMs
Rules for ensuring a competitive market. Like private markets,
PSMs need rules that govern competition in the market and these
rules need to be enforced where appropriate. Competition law
that prohibits anticompetitive behaviour (or practices) applies to
all private sector providers operating in PSMs. It should also
capture, in most circumstances, not-for-proﬁt providers and
publicly funded providers that operate in similar markets. How-
ever, it is less clear whether it applies to public sector buyers
(where they do not act as providers in the same market). Public
bodies should also bear in mind that their conduct may also
(or alternatively) be subject to other laws within the ﬁeld of
Box 3 | Barriers to entry in health-care markets
For many health-care services, the provider side of the market is likely
to be very “thin” in many parts of the country. This happens for multiple
reasons:
The geographic market for many health-care services is quite narrow.
Patients are unwilling to travel 500 miles for GP appointments
(although they may be willing to do so for specialist treatment).
Many services have very high ﬁxed costs (radiotherapy machines
cost millions of pounds).
Many services (such as A&E Departments) have large economies of
scale or scope, possibly even rising to the level of natural monopoly.
In rural areas demand is sparse, reducing the number of providers
that can be supported.
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competition law, including public procurement, merger control
and state aid laws.
Competition powers may be an imperfect tool for publicly funded providers.
The Competition Act is largely untested in PSMs. It is unclear
to what extent competition bodies would pursue the full force
of enforcement action against publicly funded providers that
infringe competition law. Enforcement action that leads to
ﬁnancial penalties being imposed on a public body for a breach
of competition law are likely to have to be met from the budget of
the public body; this could in turn impact adversely on the level
of public services available to users. However if the competition
body decides not to pursue enforcement action against a publicly
funded provider this could create tension with other priorities or
principles that competition bodies pursue:
 Equal treatment: The competition authority risks being seen
as treating providers unequally if, in similar circumstances, it
proceeds against private providers with the full rigour of
competition law but publicly funded providers do not suffer
similar sanctions. In addition, such a scenario could lead to a
“chilling effect”, which makes private providers less willing to
invest and engage in the market.
 Deterrence: Similarly, the deterrent effect will be lost if
competition authorities do not take enforcement action against
providers who infringe the law, which may risk giving
misleading signals to other publicly funded providers in the
market that they too may not face enforcement action if they
transgress.
However, in guidance issued by the (former) Ofﬁce of Fair
Trading12 to public bodies on applying competition law, it
emphasizes that a level playing ﬁeld and a similar commitment to
compliance should exist in those markets, particularly in mixed
markets in which public bodies engage in economic activities,
alongside private ﬁrms and third-sector organizations (OFT,
2011a, Paragraph 4.2). It makes clear that where competition law
does apply to a public body it could potentially expect to face
adverse consequences such as reputational impact; the possibility
of ﬁnancial penalties and or civil claims for damages (OFT, 2011a,
Paragraph 4.8–4.9).
This gives an indication of some of the types of considerations
that competition bodies are required to balance when they
consider applying competition law in relation to public bodies
acting as providers in PSMs. It is therefore important that
government works with the competition authorities to help raise
awareness of the conditions under which competition rules could
apply to public bodies’ involvement in the public services markets
they oversee. This could include outlining and illustrating the
types of behaviours and practices that should be avoided.
This still leaves the question of how the government and
competition authorities should deal with public sector buyers who
are not captured by the provisions of competition law but
potentially abuse their market position. The guidance suggests
that in response to competition concerns in a PSM (which may or
may not be captured by the provisions of the Competition Act)
the competition authority may decide to use its tools ﬂexibly
and apply a range of measures; for example, advocacy work to
help raise awareness, or a study to explore competition issues
arising in that market such as the impact of public bodies’ buyer
power on the sustainability of provision (OFT, 2011a, Paragraphs
4.10–4.11).
Alternatives to competition powers to mitigate buyer power of public bodies:
ombudsman and dispute resolution schemes. Where competition law is
not deemed to apply to a public body that has buyer power (or it
is unclear if the law applies), an alternative approach can be for
the provider to invoke a dispute resolution clause in their contract
with the public body, particularly if this refers to mediation or
alternative dispute resolution. Both are generally far cheaper than
going to court and should allow the parties to continue to engage
in a commercial relationship. In various sectors of the economy
statutory provision for a form of alternative dispute resolution
already exists:
 In the communications markets covered by the Communica-
tions Act 2003, disputes on matters not covered by competition
law or in the scope of other regulatory or legal powers,
communications providers can raise a regulatory dispute that
requires the regulator (Ofcom) to use its regulatory powers to
resolve.
 An adjudication scheme has also been set up to cover the
groceries market, and in particular the buyer/supplier relation-
ship. The job of the independent groceries code adjudicator
is to judge disputes between the suppliers and supermarkets
(that is, buyers with market power) where unfair, or abusive,
treatment is alleged.
 In ﬁnancial services, provision is additionally made for smaller
businesses (as well as consumers) to complain to the Financial
Ombudsman Service if they feel they have been treated unfairly,
and if upheld, they can order the complainant to be
compensated for their loss.
An EU directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution schemes
that are available to help complainants resolve their dispute
outside court is currently being consulted on by the UK
Government. If parties to a dispute are unable to settle their
differences, ADR offers a quicker and cheaper means of resolving
that dispute. Ombudsman schemes already exist as a back-stop
for service users of local government and the NHS where existing
complaint-handling processes have not resolved the problem to
the satisfaction of the user. While PSMs are out of the scope
of this EU directive, in principle consideration could be given to
setting up similar dispute resolution schemes as an avenue of
potential redress for providers of public services who are in
dispute with commissioners, as a way of providing quick and
cheap resolution (instead of having to take matters through the
courts).
Other key requirements for effective PSMs. As public services are “merit
goods” the state requires these services are universally available to
all those deemed eligible for them, as the beneﬁts of mandating
their provision on a free and universal basis for society as a whole
is deemed to outweigh the costs of their provision to the taxpayer.
To meet these public policy objectives, government also has in
place rules and or ﬁnancial incentives that sit alongside regulation
of markets by competition law. These rules may, for example, be
intended to ensure minimum standards or equity in provision, or
to discourage certain types of discriminatory practice by market
participants.
Alongside universality and equity, the protection of the
vulnerable is another key concept in the provision of public
services. The characteristics and often complex nature of public
services (discussed elsewhere in this article), together with the
vulnerability of many service users, requires government to
establish independent regulatory frameworks for public services
delivery. These comprise initial accreditation or licensing of
providers, and a monitoring and inspection regime to ensure that
quality standards are being upheld. An independent accreditation
or licensing regime is intended to ensure that only providers that
meet required national standards are allowed to enter the market,
or stay in the market. Independent inspection regimes monitor,
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inspect and regulate providers to ensure their services continue to
meet required standards, and take remedial action or withdraw
the licence if a provider fails to do this. In education, Ofsted
performs the role of independent quality regulator, and in health
care and social care this role is led by the CQC.
Enabling users to participate actively in the market. As in other
consumer markets, a lack of good information and advice can act
as a barrier to an effectively functioning market. In PSMs where
user choice is the means of service allocation, government can
help create the conditions for an efﬁcient market by enabling
users to participate actively in the market. Users need access to
good-quality information to inform their choice, as well as help to
assess it. They also need to be able to feel they can act on their
choice. This means enabling users to switch providers if they wish
(without causing them undue distress and inconvenience), as well
as ensuring effective means of redress exist for users who
experience poor-quality or inadequate provision.
Dimensions of information for users. As explained earlier, public
services have unusual characteristics that can inhibit the ability of
users to make effective choices. These can be intrinsic to the type
of service; in the case of “experience” or “credence” goods the
outcomes for the user can be largely unknown in advance,
making it difﬁcult to make a well-informed choice. Some public
services are by their nature complex and information on quality
and outcomes may be unsatisfactory from a user’s perspective for
any number of reasons: incompleteness; difﬁculty in its
interpretation, or in its comparability; not covering all aspects
of relevance to the user.
The various ratings and user-experience feedback surveys in
the higher education sector have developed and been reﬁned over
a number of years, and provide prospective students with a rich
resource of information. Nevertheless such user information has
to be managed, interpreted and presented properly if users are to
beneﬁt from it. The energy market is an example of where
consumers can become easily confused by the plethora of
information on different rates available, which can reach a
tipping point where the market is no longer working in the
interests of consumers. Various market solutions have emerged to
help consumers navigate the plethora of tariffs and ﬁnd the best
deals for their energy needs. The government has reduced
drastically the number of tariffs available in an attempt to deal
with this “confusopoly” problem (Hviid and Waddams-Price,
2012; Siciliani, 2014), but this is likely to reduce competition in
the market by increasing the ability of providers to price
coordinate. In health care, attempts to create tools to inform
user choice have been less systematic and are a lot less well
developed to date. The recent Friends and Family test introduced
post-Francis Report is an attempt to introduce a more systematic
approach to provide potential users with a better idea of past
users’ experiences of the health care they received at a hospital.
Owing to its specialist nature, however, patients are likely to
need to rely on the advice and support of health-care
professionals to ensure they receive appropriate treatment and
can effectively navigate the system. Health care is not the only
public service where users may require the advice and support of
an intermediary. Social care users can beneﬁt from the expert
advice and support in tailoring a suitable package of care to meet
their needs. However, the incentives on professionals in the
“system” may not always converge with the interests of the user.
For example, a GP may have to balance the wishes of the user for
an expensive course of treatment or package of care, with
pressures on their Practice budget, and the wider interests of the
taxpayer. For these reasons and others (such as ﬁtting in with
existing local commissioning arrangements), professionals may
feel constrained in the choices they are prepared to offer patients,
and more likely to default to existing care patterns and pathways
unless otherwise prompted by the patient or their advocate.
However in some areas, for example social care, personal
budget holders may have access to alternative sources of advice
that can help support them in deciding how to meet their
individual care needs. User-led organizations (some of these
have been spun-off as social enterprises from the public sector),
independent brokers and those who offer peer-support can offer
advice, support and advocacy to users that is independent of the
“system”. The (former) OFT found in research it carried out on
so-called “choice tools” that qualitative feedback on consumer
experience can help make complex decisions and comparisons
easier for users (OFT, 2011b).13
Consumer redress. While the national quality regulators (such as
Ofsted and CQC) provide service quality oversight, strong PSMs
also need effective redress mechanisms that enable individual
users who have experienced poor service, or are dissatisﬁed, to
complain and obtain a satisfactory response. This is particularly
so given the essential nature of these services and the inherently
complex, experiential and personal features of some of these types
of services (discussed earlier in this article). These features make
it more difﬁcult for users to make well-informed decisions in the
ﬁrst place about which provider to choose, and also can present
barriers to switching provider making it very inconvenient and
disruptive for the individual to switch. Redress mechanisms are
also an area where good information and advice can play a
key role as it allows users to have a better idea of the standards
they have a right to expect and how they can raise concerns
(Which?, 2014).
In addition, also discussed earlier, some PSMs have geo-
graphical constraints, which can be a key determinant in deﬁning
the local market from the perspective of users who live in an area.
Typically there may be a limit to the choice of local hospitals,
schools and so on, or, as in some areas and for some services, no
effective choice. If the local market lacks real competitive
pressures and genuine choice, and switching is not a realistic
proposition for many users in an area, the accessibility of effective
redress is vital. Otherwise users may have little prospect of proper
redress if the services they receive are substandard and need
improving.
Current research from the United Kingdom shows a general
lack of understanding about the role or importance of redress
mechanisms in public markets. For example, recent research by
the UK consumer organization Which? found that services are
poorly organized, leading to a “complaints maze” that consumers
ﬁnd hard to navigate. Which?’s survey of consumers who had
experienced a problem with public services found that over a
third did not complain, and over half of those did not take their
problem further following a ﬁrst complaint. The main reasons
cited were: scepticism that their complaint would have any
impact; a lack of understanding of the complaints process; and
fear of repercussions for the quality of ongoing services where
there was a personal relationship between complainant and
provider. Clearly there are some signiﬁcant impediments to this
element of PSMs working effectively.
Promoting healthy competition between providers
Diversity of providers and a level playing ﬁeld. PSMs typically have
a range of different types of provider.14 In some sectors
(for example, hospitals, schools, higher education institutions),
the publicly funded providers still represent the norm, while
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“not-for-proﬁt” and “for-proﬁt” providers are largely marginal
participants in such markets. In some markets such as social care,
the situation is almost the opposite; publicly funded providers are
scarce (most local authorities are no longer involved in direct
provision any more) and private or not-for-proﬁt providers
represent the bulk of provision in most areas. In other markets
such as nursery and childcare education, the picture is mixed with
a more even split between public and private providers.
Some of the factors that the (former) OFT guidance has
identiﬁed as acting as barriers to a level playing ﬁeld between
providers are differences in regulation, taxation and pensions
treatment between different types of provider; incumbency
advantages enjoyed by existing ﬁrms, such as access to
information, pre-qualiﬁcation and bid criteria, and transition
costs; and a lack of clarity in the application of competition law
(covered earlier in this article). Where barriers do exist the
position of incumbents may be strengthened and reduce the level
of competition and choice in the market.
Entry, expansion and exit of providers. Research shows (CMA, 2015)
that in private markets at least half of the increase in productivity
over time arises from the exit of less productive ﬁrms and the
entry of new and more productive ﬁrms (for example, Disney
et al., 2003). New providers that enter the market may offer a
different, innovative service or provide a service that better meets
particular needs. Competition from new entrants can also act as
an incentive for existing providers to drive up the quality of their
service or face exit (Harris and Li, 2008; Bloom and Van Reenen,
2010).
In some PSMs, potential new entrants may face difﬁculties
trying to enter the market. For example, small providers may be
deterred by what they perceive as disproportionate requirements
to meet existing accreditation and regulatory criteria. New entry
and countering barriers to entry may be achieved, however,
through a variety of means:
 spinning services out of the public sector to create new
providers in the market, and
 encouraging new entrant providers by setting prices for public
services that are neither too high (wasting taxpayer’s money),
nor too low such that they would discourage providers from
entering the market (and also potentially risk reducing the
quality of existing provision).
PSMs may only offer weak ﬁnancial incentives to expand that
act as a break upon strongly performing providers’ willingness to
take over failing providers, or create new capacity. Funding
constraints can also lead to difﬁcult trade-offs between creating
supply-side ﬂexibility (potentially important, for example, in
making competition effective between schools in an area), and
controlling public spending during periods of tight budgetary
constraint.
The regulatory context itself, with its restrictions and incentive
arrangements imposed on users’ choices and providers, respec-
tively, may act to restrict choice and competition in PSMs as has
happened at times and for various reasons in the regulated
utilities. For example, in the case of registration choices for
patients of GP services, until recently users were allowed only one
choice from GPs close to their residence (and possibly close to
their place of work). This precludes the ability of users to shop
around for GP services (which in theory would equate to
alternative providers competing for patients) in neighbouring
boroughs. In addition, GPs are paid by the number of people
registered with them, irrespective of how frequently patients are
using the practice or the quality of the service that patients receive
when they do. These arrangements lacked incentives for an
efﬁcient functioning market as choice and incentives for com-
petition among GP practices were limited.15 Similarly, the
establishment of catchment areas for schools may reduce com-
petition between neighbouring schools once again restricting both
choice by parents and competition among schools.
Competition in public services is more likely to be effective if
the incentives for providers are strong, rewarding success and
penalizing poor performance. The risk of going out of business
can act as a powerful incentive on providers to perform well.
Certain types of public service such as social care have a well-
established private sector and third-sector provider base that
represent the vast majority of provision in the market. Most care
providers in the market are small and individually they may exit
their local market without causing signiﬁcant disruption. In
principle, the closure of poorly performing providers is possible
and does sometimes occur in other public services like schools
and hospitals; however, in reality this is unlikely to happen if it
leaves the needs of the local population in the area inadequately
provided for.
Common approaches to dealing with poorly performing state
providers, particularly in health and education, is either to replace
the existing management or to allow another provider to merge
with or take over its running. It is also necessary to bear in mind
that the exit of a provider may not always be caused by poor
management; it could be partially or wholly due to the need for a
more fundamental service re-conﬁguration, such as the con-
solidation or rationalization of existing providers in the local area.
In these circumstances, replacing the leadership of the school or
hospital (etc.) is unlikely to provide an effective solution.
Service continuity. Public services such as health and social care are
essential to many people’s lives and well-being. Hence, it is
unacceptable from both an individual and societal perspective for
other types of public services, such as education or probation
services, to be disrupted for any length of time. Government’s
statutory duties require it to ensure that there is continuity of
these services, and to keep service disruption where it does occur
to a bare minimum. Government, however, wishes to avoid
providing explicit (or implicit) guarantees to support providers
that fall into ﬁnancial difﬁculties. If not, there is the risk of
“moral hazard” that a government guarantee would weaken the
incentives on providers to manage their own businesses
effectively and maintain their ﬁnancial viability, if they knew
government would step in and bail them out if they got into
ﬁnancial trouble. Therefore, the government has to ﬁnd a way to
balance the need for poorly performing providers to exit the
market with its duty to ensure service continuity and protect
users from service disruption. Both the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008
that led to the UK’s worst banking crisis (deﬁning public services
in the broadest sense to include bank accounts), and the Southern
Cross Health care debacle in 2011 revealed an important feature
of markets in public services, where service provision is in real
danger of severe disruption the state has to step in and in
extremis it becomes the “provider of last resort”.
In some sectors of the economy there are continuity arrange-
ments and formal mechanisms for oversight of a provider’s
ﬁnancial “health” at the national level. These sectors include
travel (aviation and tour operators), energy, rail and health. The
failure of Southern Cross demonstrated the risk a major business
failure can pose to both the quality of care that people receive and
to the continuity of those care services. It also led to signiﬁcant
concern and distress among the people receiving services, their
families and carers. In the event the risk to the continuity of care
was largely managed but this outcome was not a forgone
conclusion and was the result of considerable effort by a number
of organizations and individuals, without formal processes and
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powers to call upon. As a result it convinced Government that
adult social care should also have formal mechanisms in place to
ensure service continuity for all social care users (Department of
Health, 2013).
An oversight system to capture early warnings where a large or
difﬁcult-to-replace provider is facing ﬁnancial difﬁculties, and to
take action to stop the situation deteriorating, are an important
feature of public service continuity regimes. Box 4 provides an
illustration of the oversight regime in social care at the local level,
and the proposed national oversight regime.
Ensuring the market is delivering the public policy objectives.
Using markets to deliver public services does not mean that
government’s responsibilities for achieving policy objectives cost-
effectively are diluted. Yet market delivery involves provision by
non-public sector entities, which are not directly accountable to
government or the taxpayer. This lack of inﬂuence means that
government must design the legislative framework of rules for the
market, monitor its overall ﬁnancial sustainability and ensure that
system-wide the provision of public services is effective, value for
money and achieving government’s policy objectives.
According to the NAO Report, 2013, to fulﬁl this systemic role
government must be prepared to:
 Monitor and intervene, where appropriate, to calibrate central
funding, depending on the national balance of supply and
demand, and taking account of the patterns of regional
variation (and levels of spare capacity).
 Assess the likely impact of policy reforms and possible future
scenarios in terms of their likely impact on policy objectives.
 Develop an understanding at the national level of the market
structure, including market size and concentration levels, as
well as the degree of exposure to publicly funded users, price
and quality variations and trends, rates of entry and exit, and
signiﬁcant merger and acquisition activity.
 Work with the competition authorities and relevant quality and
sector regulators, to raise awareness, standards and enforce
rules and the right market behaviour.
Departments that have oversight responsibilities for market
delivery of public services may also consider adopting a
presumption that they should actively review the delivery of
public services through market mechanisms on a periodic basis.
Such a review could be undertaken by or in consultation with the
Competition and Markets Authority, or in the case of NHS-
funded health care, with Monitor. If the results of the review
suggest that signiﬁcant user detriment exists, government may
need to decide on appropriate remedies or be prepared to
consider referral of the market for more detailed investigation.
Ultimately if a PSM fails, it will be the state who retains the role as
“provider of last resort”.
Conclusions
Given that the newly constituted competition authority in the
United Kingdom, the CMA, now has an obligation to oversee the
development of competition and consumer choice in PSMs, and
the UK’s NAO has been working on developing an analytical
framework for evaluating whether such markets provide value for
money for the taxpayers when auditing such markets, our article
is a ﬁrst step into providing a conceptual economic framework for
analysing and evaluating PSMs.
The policy of delivering public services by creating quasi-
markets still indicates the need for large doses of costly
intervention irrespective of whether such markets take the form
of a monopsony, a monopoly or a more efﬁcient market
mechanism as described in Fig. 5. Our article considered the
current situation and attempted to identify the desired way
forward by looking at different types of public services. We have
identiﬁed two issues for further development and research. First,
the United Kingdom needs to develop an institutional setup that
will ensure that such markets are properly overseen, are subjected
to competition rules and/or alternative resolution mechanisms
(where appropriate) to protect sellers and/or buyers, and that the
objectives of universality and equity in provision as well as the
protection of the vulnerable are met in the provision of such
services, as well as the arrangements for the continuity of service.
The framework should also ensure healthy competition in or for
the market with users enabled to effectively participate by being
given information and consumer redress in the former case, or
through the development of commissioning and contracting skills
in procurement in the latter case. The costs that such a set up
indicates is more than offset in the case of choice merit goods
through the beneﬁts that the introduction of competition brings
into the market through innovation, value for money services and
increases in productivity that the promotion of healthy competi-
tion and choice brings through. Second, the p–p split that is part
of the transformation into a quasi-market introduces a market
failure through the creation of a principal-agent relation where
the commissioner no longer produces in-house. In the case of
compulsory merit goods it is unclear how the transaction costs
this transformation introduces are offset by the introduction of
choice and competition since the former is not desired and the
latter is not always relevant or achievable. The introduction of
competition through a quasi-market format may introduce some
efﬁciencies; however, it clearly involves the re-invention of the
system for the beneﬁt of the creation of an internal market in the
hope of raising cost efﬁciency and/or improvement in the quality
of provision. However, the social value of such services, even if
not proﬁtable, is reﬂected in the form of large externalities and
often a universal service obligation that essentially has historically
meant the need for involvement of local voluntary and charity
organizations in the provision of such services. It is not clear that
as things stand these locally based providers will be willing to
provide cost-free services for the beneﬁt of proﬁt-making
providers.
Notes
1 Intervention to correct market failures is distinct from intervention by competition
authorities to prevent companies from taking advantage of users’ behavioural biases
such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting and status quo bias (framing). Such
biases arise in many types of markets (most notably ﬁnancial services), including
Box 4 | Service continuity in social care
In the social care market, where there are many small providers, it is
clear that when these providers exit or face closure, the local authority
has a responsibility to talk to local providers and to work with them if
they decide a service must close to ensure that people are given the
necessary support to arrange alternative care. However, there are a
number of medium and large providers of care, operating across large
parts of the United Kingdom, on a signiﬁcant scale. The impact of such a
provider failing would affect many parts of the country and it is not
reasonable to expect individual local authorities to manage the
situation. National coordination and oversight is needed. Keeping
abreast of the commercial negotiations that occur if a major company
has to be wound up cannot be done effectively at the local level. The
Government’s consultation in 2013 on oversight in adult social care
recognized the strong need for a regulator to take on the role of
overseeing those care providers whose services, for whatever reason,
would be hard to replace if failure occurred.
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PSMs. This leads to the need to carefully design public policy and an institutional
framework that addresses such biases (see Barr et al., 2013; Manski, 2013).
2 The majority of modern industrial organization textbooks discuss market deﬁnition
both in a theoretical context as well as in practice; the most comprehensive book to
date on this method of analysis (used in practice by all competition authorities across
the developed and developing world) is by Motta (2004).
3 For a closer analysis on merit goods, externalities and market failures, please refer to
any microeconomics or industrial organization textbook (for example, Grifﬁths and
Wall, 2000).
4 As mentioned earlier, education to the age of 16 and some health services (for
example, vaccinations) are not optional. However, they do not belong to this second
category as they are consumed by “all” rather than a minority.
5 Pissarides (2014) argues that it is the services themselves that should be free or
subsidized, as in Scandinavian countries, rather than the users through transfers of
money to families.
6 This double agency issue is also referred to in Van Stolk et al. (2010), where providers
are expected to act as agents of both patients and payers. The shifting of the
responsibility for commissioning care to GPs has given rise to questions concerning
the commissioning skills, capacity and incentives of GPs to ensure value for money
for both their patients and the taxpayers (see Crowe et al., 2014).
7 Notably, the UCAS admissions system is currently changing its rules to allow UK
students to apply to European universities when these meet equivalent standards to
those in the United Kingdom (Coughlan, 2015).
8 See Crowe et al. (2014),Gash and Panchamia (2013),Gash et al. (2013) on contracting
in PSMs. Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) discuss the importance of looking at
supply-side issues such as entry, exit and monopolistic competition in health-care
markets. Forder and Allan (2011) look at competition in the UK care homes market
and analyse whether cross-subsidization and/or market segmentation result from the
existence of two groups of users: individual self-payers and local authority
funded ones.
9 According to the Care Act (2014), as of April 2015 all eligible people have a right to
request to receive such a direct payment.
10 Competition for the market has been used extensively in the United Kingdom, for
example in rail services, the national lottery and local bus services, to name but a few
examples. Potential providers compete to win franchises (contracts) to operate in
particular areas or provide particular services.
11 This happened in the case of prison contracts, as we discuss in the section “Provider–
purchaser (p–p) separation and weak market mechanisms”.
12 The OFT and the Competition Commission were recently merged. The new body,
CMA, took up its powers in 1 April 2014.
13 According to Mays (2013), the least problematic of the recent reforms in health, and
to some extent the most cost effective, has been the introduction of personal health
budgets.
14 Private and social sector or charity providers competing for the right to provide, thus
making the market contestable (for example, Julius, 2008, 2013).
15 For a full analysis and annotated bibliography of provider incentives in health care in
OECD countries, see Van Stolk et al. (2010).
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